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The Gap Between Law and Moral Order: An 
Examination of The Legitimacy of the Supreme 
Court Abortion Decisions. 
Lynn D. Wardle* 
I. THE GAP BETWEEN LAW AND MORAL ORDER 
A. "The Gap" 
During the Law Teachers Seminar on Law, Society, and 
Moral Order at Syracuse University in 1979, Professor Richard 
Schwartz presented a graphic image of "the gap" that may exist 
between law and moral order in society. He suggested that a cir- 
cle can be drawn to represent the moral order of a given society. 
Another circle can be drawn to represent the law of that same 
society. Sometimes, or at least regarding some issues, the two 
circles will overlap substantially. At other times, or regarding 
other issues, they will be totally disconnected with a gap be- 
tween them. (See Figure 1.) This is "the gap." 







This graphic representation of the relationship between law 
and moral order has certain shortcomings. To begin with, the 
concepts of "moral order" and "law" are difficult to describe 
* Associate Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. The author acknowledges 
the contribution of the scholars who commented on the draft of this paper that was 
presented a t  the A.S.U. and B.Y.U. Symposia on Law and Morality, and particularly 
wishes to thank Professor Richard D. Schwartz, Professor William Rich, Professor Rich- 
ard Cosgrove, Dean Martin Hickman and Dean James Clayton for their valuable 
criticism. 
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precisely. The term "moral order" refers to the core values and 
fundamental beliefs which comprise the basic mores of a partic- 
ular society at  a particular time; it is a positive morality as dis- 
tinct from the critical morality of phi10sophers.l The term "law" 
refers to positive law; the regulations of social behavior that are 
created and enforced by the government. But, "moral order" in 
modern society is so complex, so protean, and so eclectic that a 
static, two-dimensional representation obviously cannot ade- 
quately represent it for all purposes. Likewise, it is simplistic to 
represent "the law" with a precise geometric figure when our le- 
gal system is characterized by such amorphous variables as fed- 
eralism, prosecutorial discretion, jury trial, and the common law 
process. And, of course, it is extremely difficult to gauge the rela- 
tive positions of these two planets in the universe of positive 
morality. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, this diagram of "the 
gap" is an effective way to illustrate the following basic premises 
concerning the role of law in modem society. 
1) There is a moral order in society? Out of the many different 
and often conflicting values of the individuals and institutions 
that make up society may emerge a dominant moral position, a 
"core" of the moral order. The position of this core is dynamic, 
and as it changes the moral order of society moves in the direc- 
tion of that change? 
2) There is a moral content to the law.' The moral content of 
law also changes over time, and as it changes the law moves in 
the direction of that change.6 
3) The moral content of the law and moral order in society are 
seldom identical.@ 
1. The terms ''positive morality" and "critical morality" were used by Professor Jef- 
frey Murphy, a participant in the A.S.U. Symposium, to distinguish between the social 
mores which are the subject matter of h f - r  Schwartz's "moral order" and the more 
reflective type of morality with which Professor Murphy and other philosophers are pri- 
marily concerned. 
2. See Diamond, The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom, 38 Soc. RESEARCH 
42 (1971); Schwartz, Mom1 Order and Society of Law: Trends, Problems, and Prospects, 
4 ANN. REV. SOC. 577 (1978); See also K. LLEWBUYN, THE BWLE BUSH 107-18 (1960). 
3. See, e.g., E. m, AN INTRODUCFION T  LEG& REASONING 56 (1948). 
4. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Lcuo-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Hmv. L. 
REV. 630 (1958); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Hmv. L. 
REV. 593 (1958). 
5. A. NORTH, THE SUPREME COUKF: JUDICIAL PROCESS AND JUDICIAL POLITICS 169 
(1966). 
6. See Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGY pt. 2, at 
33, 37 (1965). 
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4) A natural and necessary afbi ty exists between the two 
"bodies" of law and moral order.? 
5) When there is a gap between the moral order of society and 
the law, some movement to close the gap is likely? (The law 
will move closer to the moral order of society, or the moral or- 
der will move closer to the law, or each will move toward the 
other.) The likelihood of movement to close the gap between 
law and moral order depends upon the size of the gap between 
the two bodies and the perceived significance of the subject 
matter concerning which the gap exists.' 
B. Legitimacy 
Our discussions at the Law Teachers Seminar regarding 
"the gap" stimulated my interest in the legitimacy of law and of 
our legal order system in modern society. The term "legitimacy" 
is used here to mean accepted or sanctioned by society; within 
the limits of the social system. Thus, law is "legitimate" only if 
"the gap" is not too great. 
In a democracy, law must be within the field of gravity of 
the moral order of society to be legitimate; there are limits on 
the size of the gap that a democracy can tolerate. The power of 
the law and legal institutions to function effectively in a democ- 
racy depends, ultimately, upon the allegiance of the citizen-sub- 
jects. The justice system is capable of responding to the disobe- 
dience of only a small number of citizens to specific laws. Thus, 
the respect and loyalty of society-at-large are essential to the le- 
gitimacy of law and of the legal order system. 
When the gap between any law and the moral order con- 
cerning the subject matter of that law becomes too great, there 
is danger that that law will lose its legitimacy. There is also the 
danger, at least in a democracy, that the legal system will lose its 
legitimacy. And when the gap is caused by the judiciary, there is 
great danger that the judiciary will lose its legitimacy. 
C. Judicial Activism 
The action of judges which changes the moral position of 
the law so as to create or close a significant gap between law and 
7. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 589. 
8. See Walster, Bershheid, & Walster, New Directions in Equity Research, 25 J .  
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 151 (1973). 
9. See J. COHEN, R. ROBSON, & A. BATES, PARENTAL UTHORITY: HE COMMUNITY 
AND THE LAW 195, 198 (1958). 
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moral order in society is referred to as judicial activism. (This 
paper focuses on gap-creating judicial activism.) 
In our constitutional system of checks and balances, the 
functions performed by the judiciary are unquestionably crucial 
even if they are at  times ambiguous. (The preservation of the 
balancing process that prevents the political branches of govern- 
ment from consuming each other, and democracy as well, cer- 
tainly is one of them.lO) Yet the American judiciary, historically, 
and the federal judiciary, constitutionally, are "independent" 
and politically unresponsive. Thus, although the dangers of judi- 
cial activism to the legitimacy of the law, the courts, and the 
legal order system are relatively clear, the appropriate limits on 
the activist role of the judiciary are not. 
Traditionally, the judiciary has been the least active govern- 
mental agent of social change. When the United States Consti- 
tution was proposed, its supporters argued that the judiciary 
would be "the least dangerous" branch of the federal govern- 
ment." And historically the American judiciary has been a 
classically conservative social force-a preserver and protector of 
the traditional, the established, and the status quo. Thus, the 
judiciary has been an evolutionary, rather than a revolutionary, 
institution.12 
But following the Civil War, during the Radical Republican 
Era of federal expansionism, the American judiciary assumed a 
more active policy-forming role than it previously had taken. 
Between 1890 and 1934, the United States Supreme Court inval- 
idated literally hundreds of progressive economic and social reg- 
ulations in pursuit of "economic due process," and some state 
supreme courts were even more aggressive.lS Although such judi- 
cial activism has often been condemned by scholars and judges, 
such criticisms have more frequently been indicative of the 
critics' dislike of the social policies effectuated rather than any 
consistent concern over the expanded social-policy-shaping role 
assumed by the judiciary.14 
An activist role for the judiciary now appears to be firmly 
10. See generally J. BY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
11. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (A. Hamilton). 
12. See generally A. BICKKL, THB LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); S. SCHEINCOLD, 
THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS (1974); Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 63 IOWA L. 
REV. 1 (1977). 
13. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF C O N ~ O N A L  DECISIONMAKING 738 (1975). 
14. See A. BICKKL, supra note 12, at 45-46; Ely, The Supreme Court 1977 Term, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 5, 15-16 (1978). 
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entrenched in our legal and political traditions. Yet there are 
still ways in which discontent with judicial activism may surface. 
The legitimacy of the institutions of the law may be subverted if 
the legitimacy of the law created by judicial activism is in doubt. 
And since this form of opposition is more subtle than direct at- 
tack on the role of the judiciary, it may prove to constitute the 
more serious challenge to the dynamic interaction of the law and 
moral order that is the foundation for our democratic society. 
The judiciary unquestionably performs an essential role in 
our democratic society. Therefore, if the legitimacy of the judici- 
ary as an institution may be threatened when judicial activism 
creates an intolerable gap between the law and the moral order 
of society, then certainly this is a matter for serious study. In 
the remainder of this paper I will examine the legitimacy of ju- 
dicial activism in the context of the relationship between the law 
and the moral order. I will first propose a framework of analysis 
for determining when a judicially created gap is too great; I will 
suggest three tolerance limits on legitimate judicial activism. 
Secondly, I will apply that framework of analysis to one of the 
most controversial subjects of recent judicial activism, the doc- 
trine of abortion privacy; I will test my model to see whether it 
can provide any useful perspectives about the legitimacy of the 
abortion decisions. 
The most significant challenges to the legitimacy of court- 
initiated change in the law relate to three issues: (1) Whether 
the new law is supported by an active and influential group 
within the society; (2) whether the action of the court is per- 
ceived by the other branches of government as threatening their 
own authority; and (3) whether the articulated justification for 
the court's decision is credible? These three questions roughly 
identify the tolerance limits for judicial activism. 
A. Is The New Law Supported By An Active And 
Influential Group Within Society? 
The first inquiry asks whether or not the new law comes 
within the "field of gravity" produced by the core moral order of 
15. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 578. My three criteria roughly correspond to the 
three factors identified by Professor Schwartz as contributing to the acceptance of legal 
norms by society. 
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society. Is there some active and influential group that can effec- 
tively offset any pressure that otherwise might be generated by 
reversionary groups to resist the law-change or to pull the law 
back in the direction of the existing moral order? If not, the new 
law tends to be illegitimate. 
Professor Schwartz indirectly suggested this limit on the le- 
gitimacy of judicial activism when he stated: "Instead of reflect- 
ing a general value concensus, law often implements the value 
preferences of small groups who are either strategically placed 
within the system or are able to bring power to bear from with- 
out."16 The same idea is also suggested by Stanley Diamond's 
comments about the "structural opportunism" of early state 
lawmaking authorities in deigning to "permit" in law what they 
could not prohibit? He noted that early governmental systems 
were able to grow in power by making strategically advantageous 
alliances as conflicts arose which divided political society 
internally.le 
The need for law to be accepted by an influential group in 
society in order to be legitimate is one of the primary assump- 
tions that underlies Stuart Scheingold's work, The Politics of 
Rights? In his chapters dealing with "Rights as Resources" and 
"Legal Rights and Political Mobilization," he stresses the idea 
that court-initiated law changes do not have significant force to 
effect social change, but are important in stimulating responsive 
groups within society to take political action to effectuate social 
change.'O Scheingold emphasizes that judicial decisions alone are 
not persuasive "to the elites who are most immediately responsi- 
ble for making decisions for the polity. These elites are, however, 
likely to respond to effectively organized interests, and legal 
symbols can be usefully employed in behalf of political mobiliza- 
t i~n."~ '  Accordingly, gap-producing judicial decisions must be 
supported by a politically active group to prevent other mobil- 
ized groups, whose interests are negatively affected by the deci- 
sions, from overturning the law changes. 
Thus, even though judges are not themselves politically re- 
sponsive, our legal order is. Law in a democracy must represent 
16. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 577-78. See also id. at 580, 581. 
17. See Diamond, supra note 2, at 48-50. 
18. Id. at 62-64. 
19. S. SCHNEINGOLD, supra note 12. 
20. See id. at 83-96, 131-48. 
21. Id. at 148. 
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the will, or at least the tolerance of society. To acquire legiti- 
macy, then, court-initiated law changes must find support within 
society at large-at least enough support to offset the reaction- 
ary forces that will be mobilized to resist both the law change 
and its effect on moral order.ls 
B. Is The Judicial Action Perceived By The Other Branches 
Of Government As Threatening Their Authority? 
In a two-tiered, tripartite system of government in which 
the principles of federalism and separation of powers are consti- 
tutionally established, the action of any single branch of govern- 
ment that produces a significant, gap-opening change of law 
must not be perceived by the other branches or units of govern- 
ment as threatening a usurpation of their authority or as repre- 
senting a substantial infringment of their roles in governing soci- 
ety. Thus, the second limit on legitimate judicial activism 
concerns whether or not the judiciary has exceeded its political 
"jurisdiction" by making a particular change in law. 
The "jurisdictional" limit on judicial activism poses a par- 
ticularly delicate problem for the federal courts.u In cases in 
which controversial social legislation has been sustained, the 
United States Supreme Court has often emphasized that it can- 
not strike down duly enacted statutes simply "because they may 
be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular 
school of thought."a4 
The reasons for this limit on judicial "legislating" are many, 
but three in particular should be mentioned here. The first rea- 
son is that, inasmuch as a court is not a politically responsive 
branch of government, its "currency" of legitimate judicial activ- 
ism is somewhat limited. Judicial decisions that create a gap be- 
22. Legitimacy is also, at least partially, a function of time. With the passage of time 
a law change acquires a presumption of legitimacy which enhances its acceptability. 
Thus, even if a gap-creating law change is repugnant to most active groups in society, if 
those to whom it is acceptable can prevent its outright rejection, the law change may 
acquire legitimacy over time. That is, the group supporting the law change must at least 
be able to neutralize reversionary interests and create an impasse-a temporary stagna- 
tion of the dynamic legitimation process. This may provide a continuing opportunity for 
supporters of the legal change to rally support for the movement to a new moral order, 
while the passage of time itself subtly enhances the legitimation of the new legal order. 
23. See generally A. BICKEL, supra note 12, at 65-72, 183-97; A. NORTH, supra note 
5, at 169. 
24. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955), cited in Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970). 
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tween law and moral order carry a high "cost" in this rare "cur- 
rency." As one commentator observed: "Perennial judicial policy 
making arouses a dialectical progression: it eats away the expec- 
tations of neutrality that form the principal source of the courts' 
moral support; long-continued judicial authoritarianism will ulti- 
mately destroy itself."26 The late Professor Lon Fuller argued 
that legislative functions are "parasitic" when performed by the 
courts because they sap the courts of their legitimacy? 
The second reason is that for the court to assume an active 
role in changing the morality institutionalized in the law dupli- 
cates the primary role of a competing branch of government, 
and invites contention between co-equal departments of govern- 
ment. Thus, former California Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Traynor, whose distinguished career often found him breaking 
new ground, warned judges against usurping the legislative func- 
tion when he observed: 
[Sltudents of constitutional law will find valid grounds for dif- 
ference as to how readily a court should arrive at a constitu- 
tional rule that nudges a legislature into social reform along 
one expansive front or another. . . . Nevertheless there remains 
widespread agreement that the court itself cannot be the en- 
gine of social reform. The very responsibilities of a judge as an 
arbiter disqualify him as a crusader?' 
Another highly respected state supreme court chief justice 
echoed this sentiment when he wrote: 
To the extent that courts perform their role as expected, their 
decisions, even if unpopular, will have a greater chance of be- 
ing accepted and followed by society. . . . [B]y maintaining a 
conservative stance, the courts help to preserve the sense of 
security and stability society requires. The more the other two 
branches of government engage in the politics of change, the 
greater the need for a stable and predictable judicial 
branch. . . . 
. . . If the courts deviate from their expected method of 
decision-making and issue novel and creative decisions, the sta- 
bility and security that society needs from the courts will 
wane.s8 
25. Friedma., The Courts And Social Policy, 216 NATION 467, 469 (1973). 
26. Chayes, The Role Of The Judge In Public Law Litigation, 89 Hmv. L. REV. 
1281, 1304 (1976) (citing an unpublished manuscript written by Professor Lon Fuller). 
27. Traynor, supra note 12, at 5. 
28. Cameron, The Place For Judicial Activism On The Part Of A State's Highest 
THE ABORTION DECISIONS 
The concern that judicial activism duplicates the role of a 
co-equal branch of government was well articulated by Justice 
Powell in his concurring opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson: 
There is another, and I find compelling, reason for defer- 
ring a general categorizing of sex classifications as invoking the 
strictest test of judicial scrutiny. The Equal Rights Amend- 
ment, which if adopted will resolve the substance of this pre- 
cise question, has been approved by the Congress and submit- 
ted for ratification by the States. . . . It seems to be that this 
reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a major political 
decision which is currently in process of resolution does not 
reflect appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative 
processes. 
There are times when this Court, under our system, can- 
not avoid a constitutional decision on issues which normally 
should be resolved by the elected representatives of the people. 
But democratic institutions are weakened, and confidence in 
the restraint of the Court is impaired, when we appear unnec- 
essarily to decide sensitive issues of broad social and political 
importance at the very time they are under consideration 
within the prescribed constitutional processe~.~~ 
The third reason for imposing a "jurisdictional" limit on ju- 
dicial activism is that by virtue of the method of selecting legis- 
lators and the legislative methods of operation, the legislature is 
considerably better suited for the task of determining the moral 
order of society and establishing it in law than is the judiciary. 
As Justice Marshall observed in his dissenting opinion in a re- 
cent seventh amendment case: 
Normally, in our system we leave the inevitable process of arbi- 
trary linedrawing to the Legislative Branch, which is far better 
equipped to make ad hoc compromises. In the past, we have 
therefore given great deference to legislative decisions in cases 
where the line must be drawn somewhere and cannot be pre- 
cisely delineated by reference to prin~iple.~~ 
In a similar vein, Chief Justice Traynor wrote: "Even at his most 
active, [a judge] must be alert to set limits on judicial creativity 
sufEcient to preserve the distance between judicial analysis and 
legislative innovati~n."~~ 
Court, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 279, 282 (1977) (emphasis added). 
29. 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973). 
30. Colegrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 182-83 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
31. Traynor, supra note 12, at 2. 
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Thus, judicial creation of social policy flies in the face of the 
basic premises of constitutional government with its preference 
for localized representative democracy." These concerns, and 
others, create a competitive jurisdictional restraint on judicial 
C.  Is The Articulated Rationale For The Judicial Action 
Credible? 
This factor relates solely to law changes caused by the judi- 
ciary. It focuses on the principal characteristic of the judicial 
decisionmaking process that distinguishes it from the legislative 
and executive processes. The question here is whether the legal 
analysis that constitutes the body of the formal judicial opinion 
provides a credible justification for the change in the law. 
Legal analysis is a process of reasoning by analogy to estab- 
lished authority and accepted  principle^.^ It defines the bound- 
aries of the range of decisions which the judge can make, for all 
judicial decisions must ultimately be justified by legal analysis. 
Accordingly, if the decision of a court cannot be credibly de- 
fended by legal analysis, it has failed this standard of legitimacy. 
This principle is so fundamental that it is occasionally over- 
looked. However, legal analysis is the essence of the judicial pro- 
cess, and making principled decisions that are explained credi- 
32. See generally Fordham, Judicial Policy-Making At Legislative Expense, 34 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829 (1966). 
33. The significance of this "jurisdictional" limit on the ability of courta to change 
law ought not to be overstated. As a practical matter, it is very difticult for Congress or 
the President to check judicial activism. Although Supreme Court negation of legislative 
and executive activism is now (175 years after Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1  Cranch) 
137 (1803)) an accepted tradition in this country, immediate response by the political 
branches to judicial activism is not as well accepted. For example, during the Watergate 
crisis the sitting President had the greatest of all self-interested reasons to defy the judi- 
ciary, yet he did not do so (presumably, for fear of public response). The fact that a 
crisis atmosphere existed for several weeks during the Watergate scandal underscores the 
point that direct confrontation by a political branch of government with the Court is 
unusual, uncomfortable, and especially undesirable. 
Constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court have been overturned through the 
political process only four times in the entire history of the nation. See J. Choper, Jmr- 
CUL REVIEW ISND THE NATIONAL P O L ~ C A C  PROCE~S 421 n.133 (1980). (This historical fact, 
however, may merely indicate that the federal judiciary has been exceptionally successful 
in judging how far they can go without violating this limit on their authority.) Thus, 
even though a strong negative reaction of the political branches of government must be a 
matter of concern to the federal courts, rarely has judicial activism been denied legiti- 
macy on this basis alone. 
34. See E. LEVI, supra note 3, at 1-3. 
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bly is the heart of the judicial function. As Professor Bickel 
declared, a court "can only decide the case before it, giving rea- 
sons which rise to the dignity of principle . . . ."56 He further 
observed that "[wlhen it strikes down legislative policy, the 
Court must act rigorously on principle, else it undermines the 
justification for its As Chief Justice Traynor stated: "A 
judge must do more than decree; he must reason every inch of 
the way."" Thus, judicial politics could be described as the 
politics of reason rather than of power.s8 
Professor Wechsler, in his famous dissertation on neutral 
principles, declared that "[tlhe virtue or demerit of a judgment 
turns . . . entirely on the reasons that support it and their ade- 
quacy to maintain any choice of values it decrees . . . . , 9 5 9  He 
stressed that: 
[a] principled decision . . . is one that rests on reasons with 
respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their gener- 
ality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that 
is involved. When no sufficient reasons of this kind can be as- 
signed for overturning value choices of the other branches of 
the Government or of a state, those choices must, of course, 
Archibald Cox probably best summarized the underlying con- 
cern when he observed that "[tlhe court's power to give its deci- 
sions the force of legitimacy ultimately depends in large measure 
upon its professional artistry in weaving wise statecraft into the 
fabric of law. . . ."'l He also wrote: 
Court decrees draw no authority from the participation of the 
people. . . . It comes, to an important degree, from the continu- 
ing force of the role of law-from the belief that the major in- 
fluence in judicial decisions is not fiat but principles which 
bind the judges as well as the litigants and which apply con- 
sistently among all men today, and also yesterday and 
t o r n o r r o ~ ~ ~  
35. A. BICKEL, supra note 12, at 69-70. 
36. Id. 
37. Traynor, supra note 12, at 11. 
38. S. SCHIENGOLD, supra note 12, at 37. 
39. H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDM~ENTAL L W27 (1961). 
40. Id. 
41. A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT 48 (1968). 
42. Id. at 21, 22. 
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The contemporary abortion controversy provides an excel- 
lent subject for a trial application of my model of tolerance lim- 
its on judicial activism. Before 1973 there was no "abortion doc- 
trine" in American constitutional law. "The law" regarding 
abortion consisted of the various statutes enacted by the state 
legislatures, and that covered a tremendous range of positions. 
The historic American rule had been that abortions were illegal 
except when necessary to save the life of the mother. However, 
between 1967 and 1972, responding to a popular reform move- 
ment, thirteen state legislatures revised their abortion laws to 
follow the liberalized abortion provisions of the proposed Model 
Penal Code (which allowed abortion in three exceptional situa- 
tions-grave maternal health risk, felonious intercourse, and for 
eugenic reasons (when the child might be born with a severe 
mental or physical defect)). Four other states went even further 
and effectively allowed abortion-on-demand during part of the 
term of pregnancy. In the remaining American jurisdictions (ap- 
proximately two-thirds of the states), abortion could be per- 
formed legally only when the mother's life (or, in some states, 
her health) was endangered. 
In 1973, after years of growing debate in the states, the 
United States Supreme Court attempted to judicially resolve, 
once and for all, the abortion controversy for the entire country. 
In Roe v. W ~ d e , ' ~  the Court announced that a fundamental right 
of privacy implicit in the fourteenth amendment protects the 
decision of pregnant women whether or not to have an abortion. 
The strictest standard of judicial scrutiny was held to apply to 
laws infringing upon this right of abortion privacy. Reasoning 
that unborn children are not "persons in the whole sense" and 
are not entitled to legal protection before viability, the Court 
fashioned a three-part constitutional rule regulating abortion. 
The effect of Roe was to mandate, as a matter of constitutional 
law, that states permit abortion-on-demand during at least the 
first six months of pregnancy.44 
The effect of Roe and its companion case Doe v. Bolton4' 
43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
44. For a more complete discwion of the holding and results of the 1973 abortion 
decisions, see L. WARDLE, THE ABORTION PRIVACY DOCTRINE: A COMPENDIUM AND CRI- 
TIQUE OF FEDERAL COURT ABORTION CASES (1980). 
45. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
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was revolutionary. All existing abortion laws (including all of the 
recently liberalized abortion laws) were invalidated, wholly or in 
part.46 Instead of resolving the dispute, however, the Court's ac- 
tion appears to have intensified the controversy. Much of the 
criticism of the Roe decision focuses upon its arbitrary approach 
and its inconsistency with current and traditional social mores.47 
Thus, the judicially created abortion doctrine presents an excel- 
lent opportunity for a contemporary case-study applying the 
three limits on legitimate judicial activism that have just been 
described. 
Application of the tolerance limits on judicial activism to 
the abortion controversy is predicated on one important as- 
sumption. I posit that the doctrine of abortion privacy is the re- 
sult of judicial activism, i.e., that the abortion decisions of the 
Supreme Court4. represent a gap-creating movement of the law 
away from the moral order of society. Undoubtedly there was 
some gap between pre-Roe abortion laws of the various states 
and the moral order of society (as the success of abortion law 
reform movement in the late 1960's and early 1970's demon- 
. strated). But I am suggesting that Roe and its progeny have cre- 
ated a new and significantly wider gap between the law and 
moral order than previously existed. 
A. The Abortion Doctrine Is Unacceptable To Most 
Members Of Society 
The constitutional doctrine of abortion privacy spawned by 
Roe is at least partially unacceptable to most members of soci- 
ety. And the abortion doctrine is strongly opposed by a signifi- 
cant minority of the American public. 
Consider the following data: First, when the Supreme Court 
decided Roe, legislation restricting abortion was already in effect 
in all the states and territories. In fact, in two-thirds of the 
46. See Moore, Moral Sentiment in Judicial Opinions on Abortion, 15 SANTA CLARA 
Law. 591, 633 (1975); Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of 
Life and Law, 87 Hmv. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973). 
47. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 27-29 (1975); A. Cox, THE ROLE 
OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 53, 113 (1976). 
48. The "abortion decisions" of the United States Supreme Court include the fol- 
lowing: Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 US. 379 (1979); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. 
Roe, 432 US. 464 (1977); Bed v. Doe, 432 US. 438 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 
(1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 US. 52 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 US. 179 
(1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 US. 113 (1973). 
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states only "lifesaving" or "health preserving" abortions were le- 
gally permissible. The laws of these states were effectively inval- 
idated by Roe. Another thirteen states had recently liberalized 
their abortion laws and adopted the provisions of the Model Pe- 
nal Code. Those provisions also were effectively declared to be 
unconstitutional in Doe. Even the most liberal abortion laws 
then in effect, which permitted abortion-on-demand during part 
of the period of pregnancy, were unconstitutionally restrictive 
under the doctrine of abortion privacy? 
By itself, the invalidation of all existing abortion laws might 
not necessarily suggest that the abortion decisions were unac- 
ceptable to a majority of Americans. After all, as conceded ear- 
lier, there was disparity between the pre-Roe abortion laws and 
public morality. But during the five or six years before Roe vir- 
tually (if not literally) every state considered modification of its 
existing abortion laws-and about one-third revised them. This 
did not occur secretly. There was tremendous public interest 
and political debate about abortion reform. In light of the atten- 
tion that had been devoted to the issue, and the changes that 
had been made through the political processes prior to 1973, the . 
effect of Roe to invalidate all of the laws does suggest that Roe 
went beyond the contemporary moral order. 
Second, ever since Roe was decided, state legislatures have 
been extremely active in adopting legislation attempting to rein- 
state abortion restrictions. The same year the Supreme Court 
decided Roe and Doe, thirty-nine different abortion bills re- 
sponding to those decisions were passed by various state legis- 
l a t u r e ~ . ~ ~  Six years later, in 1979, another forty-one new abortion 
laws were enacted by state legislatures." And in the seven years 
since Roe was decided, one-half of all fertility related legislation 
has concerned abortion. From 1973 through 1979, a total of 176 
separate abortion bills were enacted into law by state 
 legislature^.^^ 
Third, public attitudes about abortion have remained virtu- 
ally constant for the last eight years. A majority of Americans 
disagree, at  least in part, with the abortion-on-demand rule es- 
tablished by the Supreme Court  decision^.^ One survey compar- 
49. See text at note 46 supra. 
50. See 9 FAM. PLAN. & POPULATION REP. 15 (1980). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1979, at 49, col. 1; Washington Post, Aug. 27, 1980, 
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ing attitudes between 1972 and 1976 about permitting abortions 
for six different reasons found that the percentage of Aplericans 
who approved of abortion had risen by a6 average of only four 
percent in each of the six categories." (Although a large major- 
ity of those polled agreed that abortion should be legal in the 
cases of serious danger to maternal health, rape, and when there 
is a likelihood of serious defect in the baby, only one-half (forty- 
seven to fifty-four percent) agreed in 1976 that abortions should 
be allowed for economic reasons, to avoid a stigma of unwed 
motherhood, or to limit family size. In fact, the approval rates 
for the abortion for the last four reasons have all fallen since the 
1973-1974 period of peak abortion approvaP 
Of even greater interest, the Gallup Poll has evaluated pub- 
lic opinion on a standard set of questions every year since the 
Supreme Court decisions were rendered. The results for 1980 re- 
vealed that approximately twenty-five percent of the adults 
questioned favored abortion-on-demand, approximately fifty- 
five percent opposed abortion-on-demand but favored legalized 
abortions in only certain circumstances, and about twenty per- 
cent of all adults polled would allow no legalized abortion except 
when necessary to save maternal life? These figures are almost 
the same (only four percent variation) as they were in 1973, the 
year Roe was decided." Thus, there has been no statistically sig- 
nificant change in the public attitude about abortion since the 
Supreme Court decisions. Even though significant minorities 
strongly endorse or oppose the Supreme Court decisions in toto, 
a large majority disagree with at least the most crucial element 
of the abortion doctrine, i.e., abortion-on-demand. 
Finally, the most important index of moral order regarding 
political or social issues within society at any given time is prob- 
ably the ballot box. Although the political process is very com- 
plex, and election results can easily be misinterpreted, the im- 
pact of abortion as an election issue cannot be ignored. In 1978, 
six United States Senators were targeted for defeat by a right- 
to-life political action group, and all six were defeated. This in- 
cluded the stunning defeat of Senator Richard Clark of Iowa, 
8 A, at 16, col. 1. 
54. Tedrow & Mahoney, Trends in Attitudes Toward Abortion: 1972-1976, 43 PUB. 
OPINION. Q. 181, 183 (1979). 
55. Id. at 183 (Table 1). 
56. Washington Post, Aug. 27, 1980, 5 A, at 16, col. 1. 
57. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1979, at 49, col. 1. 
826 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW El980 
and a "clean sweep" by pro-life candidates in the major political 
races in Minnesotae5: In the 1980 primaries, Ronald Reagan's 
pro-life position was one of the factors identified as contributing 
to his sweep to victory, and that year the Republican Party be- 
came the first major American political party to call for a consti- 
tutional amendment for the purpose of reversing Roe as part of 
the official party platform." (The stunning victory nationwide of 
conservative, anti-abortion candidates in the 1980 general elec- 
tion60 also may evidence public dissatisfaction with the abortion 
doctrine.) 
Therefore, the judically created doctrine of abortion privacy 
is probably unacceptable, at least in part, to a large majority of 
the American public. However, this does not address the critical 
question about legitimacy. The first tolerance limit on judicial 
activism focuses on the other side of the issuewhether or not 
the judical decision is supported by an active aqd influential 
group in society. And the same statistics that show that the 
abortion doctrine is at least partially unacceptable to most 
Americans also reveal that it is strongly favored by a large mi- 
nority (approximately twenty-five percent) of the American pub- 
lic, and that it is at least acceptable in part to the vast majority 
of the public."' Similarly, such large and influential groups as 
the Planned Parenthood Federation of America and the Ameri- 
can Civil Liberties Union, not to mention such smaller and more 
partisan groups as the National Abortion Rights Action League, 
have been extremely active in supporting the pro-abortion deci- 
sions of the Supreme Court." Thus, although the abortion deci- 
sions appear to be at least somewhat inconsistent with the moral 
attitudes of most Americans, it does not appear that the abor- 
tion decisions have failed this standard of legitimacy because 
they have been vigorously supported by an active and influential 
group within society. As these pro-abortion groups have suc- 
ceeded to date in at least offsetting the influence that the anti- 
58. See, eg., Golden, Abortion's Morning After, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1978, A, at 
20. See also National Right to Life News, 11 (Dec. 1978); National Abortion Rights 
Action League Newsletter, 1 (Dec. 1978). 
59. 38 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2034 (1980). 
60. See National Riht  to Life News, (Nov. 10, 1980) (entire issue). 
61. See notes 53-57 and accompanying text supra. 
62. One need only look at the organizations that have been active as litigants or 
amici curiae in the abortion cases to find evidence abundant that many influential orga- 
nizations have actively supported-and aggressively encouraged expanding-the Roe 
doctrine of abortion privacy. 
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abortion groups have exerted upon strategically-placed decision- 
makers within society, it would appear that the abortion deci- 
sions must be acknowledged to be legitimate on this basis. 
B. The Supreme Court Has Exceeded Its Proper 
Institutional Role In The ~ b o r t i o n  Cases 
Not since the Supreme Court abandoned economic due pro- 
cess forty years ago has it been so widely criticized for engaging 
in "social legislation" under the guise of interpreting the Consti- 
tution as it has for the abortion decisions. The abortion deci- 
sions were immediately and severely criticized by prestigious 
constitutional scholars for their resurrection of substantive due 
Prominent among these attacks have been the criti- 
cisms of commentators who favor liberalized abortion laws. For 
example, in his acclaimed Yale Law Journal article condemning 
the Court "not so much [because] it bungles the question it sets 
itself, but rather [because] it sets itself a question the Constitu- 
tion has not made the Court's business,"64 Professor John Hart 
Ely paused to note, "Were I a legislator I would vote for a stat- 
ute very much like the one the Court ends up drafting."6s Like- 
wise, Alexander Bickel looked beyond his apparent personal 
sympathy for the abortion policy the Court adopted, and criti- 
cized the Court for violating the institutional restraints on judi- 
cial action. He asked, "Should not the question then have been 
left to the political process, which in state after state can achieve 
not one but many accomodations, adjusting them from time to 
time as attitudes change?"66 
Other judges, including other federal judges, have criticized 
the Court for exceeding its jurisdiction in deciding the abortion 
cases. In response to the survey of a political science professor in 
1975 and 1976, 165 federal judges and eighty-four state court 
judges expressed their discomfort with the abortion decisions. 
"Many judges in both samples labeled Roe v. Wade massive 'ju- 
dicial legi~lation'."~~ Indeed, the rigid, formalistic, non-analytical 
application of stare decisis in so many of the early, post-Roe, 
63. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment On Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE 
L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion 
Cases, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 159. 
64. Ely, supra note 63, at 943. 
65. Id. at 926. 
66. A. BICKEL, supra note 47, at 28. 
67. Caldeira, Judges Judge The Supreme Court, 61 JUDICATURE 208, 212 (1977). 
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abortion decisions of the lower federal courts may have resulted 
in part from the perception of federal judges that on this issue 
the Supreme Court had really overdone it, and that the only way 
the independence of the judiciary as an institution could be pre- 
served in the face of widespread criticism would be by "closing 
ranks" on the issue.68 
At one time the argument was profferred that it was neces- 
sary for the Supreme Court to try to resolve the abortion contro- 
versy because the political processes were frozen and legislators 
were "trapped" because the heavy "religious" overtones of the 
abortion controversy prevented the political system from being 
responsive to the desires of the citizenry for liberalized abortion 
legislati~n.~~ This argument has now been abandoned by even its 
chief proponent.70 And it is just as well, for this theory simply 
could not stand up under the facts. Pregnant women and others 
who favored abortion liberalization were not denied the right to 
register to vote. They were not kept away from the polls by 
armed mobs. They were not barred from lobbying in the halls of 
legislatures. Nor were their efforts doomed to futility because of 
intrinsic inequities in the political system. Quite the contrary: 
Register, vote, and lobby they did-with ex traord i~ry  success. 
In light of the facts that one-third of the states adopted signifi- 
cantly liberalized abortion laws in the six-year span between 
1967 and 1972, and that abortion liberalization was achieved 
through both legislative enactment and popular referenda, it is 
absurd to assert that judicial action was "necessary" in 1973 be- 
cause the political process whs "frozen" by religious entangle- 
ment; that state legislators were "trapped;" or that the rights of 
a discrete and insular minority needed to be protected by an 
impartial and neutral judiciary. 
Thus, it could easily be said that the Supreme Court ex- 
ceeded its institutional limits when it "legislated" the abortion 
decisions. But again, this fails to address the critical issue of 
whether or not the abortion decisions have been perceived by 
one of the co-equal branches of gqvernment as threatening their 
institutional authority. And 9n this specific point, it appears 
that the abortion decisions are quite safe-at least for the time 
being. In the first place, the abortion debate was (and still is) so 
68. See L. WARDLE, supra note 44, at 303. 
69. Tribe, supra note 46, at 18-25. 
70. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL L W928 (1978). 
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deeply controversial that, in the words of one distinguished 
scholar, when the Supreme Court in 1973 stepped in and as- 
sumed responsibility for deciding the issue "[tlhe sighs of relief 
as this particular albatross was cut from the legislative and exec- 
utive necks seemed to me audible."'l 
The action, or inaction, of the Congress and the President 
since these Supreme Court decisions were rendered ref irms 
this assumption. Indeed, while Congress has solemnly listened to 
a small army of witnesses complaining about the abortion deci- 
sions, and while numerous resolutions and dozens of bills have 
been introduced calling for actions ranging all the way to consti- 
tutional amendments, virtually no legislative response has 
emerged since 1976 except for the amendments to the annual 
appropriations bills which limited public funding of abortions. 
The dispute over public funding of abortions comes much 
closer to the precipice. After all, the Constitution specifically 
gives to Congress the power over the federal purse.72 Thus, the 
decisions of the Supreme Court in the 1977 abortion funding 
cases, upholding the power of Congress to prohibit the public 
funding of elective abortions," avoided a possible confrontation 
with Congress on this point. And the 1980 public funding deci- 
sions,?' in which the Supreme Court upheld the power of Con- 
gress even to refuse to subsidize certain "medically necessary" 
abortions (i.e., abortions which are recommended for medical 
reasons, but which are not necessary to save the life of the 
mother), also avoided any appearance of a judicial usurpation of 
congressional authority. Inasmuch as 238 members of Congress 
(including more than a majority of the members of the House of 
Representatives) filed an amicus curiae brief with the Supreme 
Court in the 1980 Hyde Amendment case urging the Court not 
to interfere with the operation of the Hyde Amendment, and ar- 
guing that Congress-not the Court-had the constitutional 
duty to determine fiscal matters, including the extent of public 
funding of abortions," the Court's decision upholding the Hyde 
Amendment avoided a sure confrontation on this point. 
71. Ely, supra note 63, at 947. 
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 7(1), 5 8(1). 
73. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Bed v. 
Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). 
74. Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct. 2694 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 
(1980). 
75. Brief Amicus Curiae of Rep. Jim Wright, et. al., Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 
2671 (1980). b 
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Thus, from 1973 to 1980 the Supreme Court apparently 
avoided creating the perception among the coordinate branches 
of government that it has usurped their powers. And even 
though the Court probably has exceeded its judicial function (as 
a matter of scholarly observation), so long as the members of 
Congress and the President do not consider the Supreme Court 
abortion decision to deprive them of any of their authority to 
deal with politically desirable issues, the abortion decisions will 
retain legitimacy on this point.76 
C. The Opinions Of The Court In The Abortion Cases Are 
Not Credible 
Only on this point does it appear that the abortion decisions 
have already fallen below the standard of legitimacy for judicial 
activism. The Supreme Court opinions in the abortion cases are 
so poorly reasoned that they fall below minimum standards of 
acceptable legal analysis. In another context, inadequate legal 
analysis in a Court opinion might be less important. But on an 
issue that is so controversial, the failure of the Court to provide 
a credible justification for its action is a grievous shortcoming. 
The opinions of the Court in Roe and Doe have been con- 
demned almost unanimously by legal scholars. Roe has been 
criticized for the inadequacy of the "facts" on which it was 
based:7 for the inadequacy of its consideration of vital constitu- 
tional concerns," for its resurrection of substantive due pro- 
ces~,'~ for its absence of any "principled" annslysi~;~ and for its 
attempt to judicially mandate an absolute solution to a complex 
76. However, if a Congress is elected that views the abortion decisions as an intoler- 
able usurpation of legislative authority, or if the Supreme Court's decision in some fu- 
ture abortion case is so intransigent or doctrinaire as to create the fear that the Court 
intends to exceed an acceptable degree of infringement on the legislative function, the 
legitimacy of the abortion decisions on this point could quickly vanish. 
77. See, e.g., Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 
FORD. L. REV. 807 (1973); Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a Life- 
Protective Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250 (1975); Witherspoon, Impact of the 
Abortion Decisions Upon the Father's Role, 35 JUR. 32, 41-47 (1975). 
78. See, e.g., A. Cox, supra note 47, at  53; Destro, supra note 77, at 1250-61; Ely, 
supra note 63, at 923-26. 
79. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 63, at 937-43; Epstein, supra note 63, at  159. See also 
R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 249-347 (1977); Tribe, supra note 46, at  2. 
80. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 47, at  27-29; Tribe, supra note 46, at  7; Ely, 
supra note 63, at  943-47; J. NOWAIC, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 630- 
31 (1978). See also R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS ERIOUSLY 123-30 (1977). 
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political contr~versy.~' 
Professor Bickel chastised the High Court for ruling by 
judicial fiat and for failing to explain its reasoning: "One is left 
to ask why. The Court never said. It refused the discipline to 
which its function is properly subject. It simply asserted the re- 
sult it reached.'"' Professor Ely wrote: "At times the inferences 
the Court has drawn from the values the Constitution marks for 
special protection have been controversial, even shaky, but never 
before has its sense of an obligation to draw one been so obvi- 
ously lacking."8s He further observed: "Roe lacks even colorable 
support in the constitutional text, history, or any other appro- 
priate source of constitutional doctrine . . . ."" Professor Ely 
concluded his stinging analysis of Roe by observing that it "is 
bad because it is bad constitutional law, or rather because it  is 
not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation 
to try to be? 
Professor Epstein commented that the Supreme Court's ra- 
tionale for its abortion decisions was so poor that "[wlhat 
seemed to make sense as a matter of principle to a lot of people 
and a lot of lawyers is all of the sudden suspect."86 Professor 
Cox summarized the criticisms well when he wrote: 
My criticism of Roe v. Wade is that the Court failed to 
establish the legitimacy of the decision by not articulating a 
precept of specific abstractness to lift the ruling above the level 
of political judgment . . . . Constitutional rights ought not to 
be created under the Due Process Clause unless they can be 
stated in principles sufficiently absolute to give them roots 
throughout the community and continuity over significant pe- 
riods of time, and to lift them above the level of the pragmatic 
political judgments of a particular time and place.87 
Federal and state judges, surveyed three years after the 
abortion decisions were announced, criticized the decisions for 
the same reasons. "For these judges, the justices' opinions on 
abortion in Roe lacked sufficient reasoning to justify this judicial 
81. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 47, at 27-29; Destro, supra note 77, at 1259-60, 
Epstein, supra note 63, at 183-86. See also L. WARDLE, supra note 44 (Introduction). 
82. A. BICKEL, supra note 47, at 28. 
83. Ely, supra note 63, at 936-37 (emphasis added). 
84. Id. at 943. 
85. Id. at 947 (emphasis in original). 
86. Epstein, supra note 63, at 179. 
87. A. Cox, supra note 47, at 113-114. 
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excursion into the field of morals."88 
Clearly, then, the abortion opinions do not adequately jus- 
tify the results reached. As examples of judicial craftsmanship, 
the Roe and Doe opinions are an embarrassment to the profes- 
sion. Unquestionably, the abortion decisions lack legitimacy on 
this point. 
This defect, alone, probably does not render the legal rules 
established by the abortion decisions illegitimate. After all, the 
quality of legal analysis is not a matter of first importance for 
many persons outside legal circles. And, it must be admitted, 
that even the most well-written and credibly analyzed opinion 
dealing with such a controversial issue would incur the criticism 
of activists favoring the losing side. 
But the language of the law is not without significance. And 
the language of the abortion decisions fails to motivate, or even 
justify. When one considers the abortion doctrine and asks 
"why," these cases do not provide a satisfying answer. There is 
an emptiness here, a lack of principle and reason. When one 
reads the abortion cases, one has the uneasy feeling that some- 
day (perhaps soon) Roe and its progeny will come back to haunt 
a new generation of Americans as did the Court's opinions in 
Dred Scott v. Sanford,8@ and Plessy u. Ferguson.@O 
D. The Legitimacy of The Abortion Decisions 
What does application of the model of tolerance limits re- 
veal about the abortion decisions? It provides ,a tentative conclu- 
sion that the abortion decisions are currently "legitimate7'-so 
far as that term has been used in this paper to mean compatibil- 
ity with contemporary social mores, or being within the "gravita- 
tional field" surrounding the core moral order of society. Inas- 
much as the abortion decisions are strongly supported by a 
politically active minority in society (and are acceptable, in part, 
to a substantial majority), and inasmuch as the political 
branches of government do not now perceive any threat to their 
authority, the judicially created doctrine of abortion privacy 
passes the test of "legitimacy" in the context of the "gap" be- 
tween the law and moral order in society. The fact that the 
abortion decisions do not contain credible, much less persuasive, 
88. Caldeira, supra note 67, at 212. 
89. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
90. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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reasoning impairs the legitimacy of the abortion doctrine. The 
Court's prestige and reputation probably have suffered, and per- 
haps we will see a more cautious judiciary in other cases in the 
future. But the new law-the abortion doctrine-is substantially 
legitimate, if only temporarily so. 
The continuing abortion controversy underscores the fact 
that law in a diverse, dynamic, politically responsive society is 
always susceptible to change. Because a law-change is legitimate 
does not suggest that it will be permanent. The abortion issue 
still is very controversial; it may be the civil rights issue of the 
1980's. While the doctrine of abortion privacy is legitimate now, 
it may not be so in five years. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The gap between the law and moral order of society is the 
birthplace of political discontent. Because a judicially created 
gap develops without the benefit of democratic participation, it 
poses a special risk for exceeding the tolerance limits of society. 
It also may constitute a threat to the legitimacy of the judiciary 
as an institution. Therefore, it would be valuable to be able to 
evaluate the legitimacy of the "gap" created by judicial activism. 
I have proposed three tolerance limits for measuring judicial 
activism: (1) The law-change must be supported by a politically 
active and influential group in society; (2) it must not be per- 
ceived by other branches of government as usurping their pow- 
ers; and (3) the articulated rationale for the law-change must be 
credible. Applying these standards to a recent product of judi- 
cial activism, the abortion decisions, no major flaws in my model 
are revealed. It also appears that the abortion doctrine passes 
the first two tests, but fails the third. I would conclude that the 
judicially created doctrine of abortion privacy presently is legiti- 
mate, notwithstanding the inadequacy of the Supreme Court's 
opinions, but that the judiciary (or, at least, judicial activism) 
has suffered some loss of prestige, and the controversy 
continues. 
The remaining, difficult question is whether I have over- 
looked an essential element. Is there not a fourth factor re- 
quired-a morality per se element? To be legitimate must not a 
law or rule of law be moral in a larger sense than merely being 
compatible with contemporary social attitudes? Are not some 
values so fundamental that if they are negated by a law, however 
popular it may be, that law is not legitimate? If so, what are 
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these values? How are these values. to be identified? Who in our 
society identifies them? In the abortion context, should the 
"moral belief-acting to save life" defense be accepted as a valid 
exculpating defense in cases where pro-life protestors are prose- 
cuted for blocking access to abortion clinics? 
My failure to address these intriguing questions does not re- 
sult from a failure to appreciate that they have been asked and 
must be considered. As my colleagues can readily attest, I hold a 
very strong opinion about the morality of abortion: I believe that 
it is a terribly immoral and cruel practice, fundamentally incon- 
sistent with the very notion of law; it is the ultimate form of 
invidious discrimination against the ultimately defenseless class. 
But in this paper I have deliberately avoided addressing the 
philosophical issue of rightness or wrongness. The scope of my 
inquiry has been much more modest. I have attempted to ex- 
amine the legitimacy of law, not the critical morality of it. 
My approach is largely a result of my respect for the works 
of such luminaries as H.L.A. Hart,B1 Lon Fuller,g2 and John Noo- 
nan,B3 and the belief that I can add little to what they have al- 
ready said. It is also the result of my conviction that the most 
important values in any system of secular law are procedural 
(what Professor Fuller called the "inner morality of law"), and 
that in a democracy one of the most fundamental of these is the 
value of public participation in the formulation of substantive 
laws. 
Finally, I have focused on the legitimacy of the abortion pri- 
vacy doctrine, in part, because of comments'some of my anti- 
abortion friends have made suggesting that the abortion deci- 
sions are so immoral that they are not legitimate and need not 
be obeyed. As both a supporter of our legal order system and a 
critic of Roe u. Wade, I am convinced that it would be tragic for 
anti-abortionists to adopt a policy of confrontation and civil dis- 
obedience because of an erroneous belief that the abortion deci- 
sions are not legitimate. While I agree that the abortion privacy 
doctrine is an immoral rule of law which, if perpetuated in its 
present form, could lead to an unprecedented American holo- 
91. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 
(1958). 
92. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 630 (1958). 
93. J. NOONAN, THE MORALITY OF ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL P E R S P E ~ S  
(1970). 
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caust of both physical and spiritual dimensions, I also believe 
that there still exist many methods by wbich this judicial doc- 
trine can be opposed and overturned without defying the law. 
And to wantonly defy a legitimate law while established avenues 
of redress are open would weaken our whole system of law and 
jeopardize those very processes which historically have func- 
tioned successfully (if slowly) to repudiate immoral laws and 
preserve a democratic legal order. 
